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Relative Function: Nuclear Brain Imaging in United States Courts
Abstract
Neuropsychological testing--medical imaging of the brain structure and function--allows the expert to
inform the court on the brain structure and function of the forensic examinee. Supported by extensive
clinical use, neuropsychological testing and structural imaging in the form of computerized tomography
and structural magnetic resonance imaging have achieved general acceptance in court. However,
functional imaging such as functional MRI and nuclear medicine techniques, such as positron emission
tomography (PET), have faced more admissibility challenges. While functional imaging is becoming an
increasingly important tool in assessing neuropsychiatric illness, we surmise that evidentiary challenges
are largely related to the phase of trial in which the nuclear study is offered as evidence. This article will
review the basic science of functional nuclear imaging including PET and single photon emission
computed tomography. We will then review cases where admissibility of these techniques has been
challenged and consider whether and how nuclear brain imaging can influence the outcome of the trial.
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Relative function:
Nuclear brain imaging in
United States courts
BY SUSAN E. RUSHING, M.D., J.D.
AND DANIEL D. LANGLEBEN, M.D.

Neuropsychological testing-medical imaging of the brain
structureand function-allows the expert to inform the court
on the brain structure andfunction of the forensic examinee.
Supported by extensive clinical use, neuropsychologicaltesting
and structural imaging in the form of computerized tomography
and structural magnetic resonance imaging have achieved
general acceptance in court. However,functional imaging such as
functional MRI and nuclearmedicine techniques, such as positron
emission tomography (PET), have faced more admissibility
challenges. While functional imaging is becoming an increasingly
important tool in assessing neuropsychiatric illness, we surmise
that evidentiary challenges are largely related to the phase of
trial in which the nuclear study is offered as evidence. This article
will review the basic science of functional nuclear imaging
including PET and single photon emission computed tomography.
We will then review cases where admissibility of these techniques
has been challenged and consider whether and how nuclear brain
imaging can influence the outcome of the trial.
CT scan, fMRI scan, MRI scan, nuclear imaging,
PET scan, SPECT scan.
KEY WORDS:

AUTHORS' NOTE: For additional information about this article, contact

Susan Rushing, M.D., J.D., Department of Psychiatry, 3535 Market
Street, 4th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19104. E-Mail: susan.rushingmdjd
@gmail. com.
© 2012 by FederalLegal Publications.Inc.

NUCLEAR BRAIN IMAGING IN U. S. COURTS

Positron emission tomography (PET) and single photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT) are nuclear
medicine techniques that use energy emitted during
radioactive decay to produce three-dimensional images of
internal organs, including the brain. The ability of radiolabeled
biological compounds to enter brain structures provides
valuable information on the inner workings or impairments of
the brain structure under analysis. Since PET and SPECT are
sensitive to functional changes on the order of seconds and
minutes, they are considered "functional" imaging techniques.
Clinical PET of the brain
Fluorine-18 (18F) labeled glucose is the radioligand most
commonly used in clinical brain PET. Glucose is
radiolabeled with 18F by substituting the hydroxyl group
with 18F to create the radioligand 2-deoxy-2-(18F)-fluoroD-glucose (18FDG). 18FDG is taken up by brain cells in the
same way as unlabeled glucose, but after phosphorylation to
18FDG-6-phosphate it cannot continue glycolysis and
becomes trapped in the brain cell. The PET scanner detects
the amount of labeled glucose taken up by the brain. Other
elements such as oxygen and nitrogen can be radiolabeled
and their metabolism imaged. As nuclear medicine studies
based on the metabolism of these compounds are rarely
admitted in court, they will not be discussed in detail here.
18FDG-PET is a universally accepted clinical test in the
diagnosis and follow up of malignancy (Bomanji, Costa, &
Ell, 2001; Necib et al., 2011), myocardial viability, epilepsy
(Kim, Lee, Lee, Chung, Chung, & Lee, 2002; Kim et al.,
2003), and degenerative brain disease (Desgranges et al.,
2002; Ishii et al., 2001; Jeong et al., 2005; Juh, Kim, Moon,
Coe, & Suh, 2004; Newberg & Alavi, 2005). Other relatively
common clinical uses include pre-surgical planning, poststroke evaluation (Ances, Liebeskind, Newberg, Jacobs, &
Alavi, 2004), and evaluation of moderate to severe traumatic

brain injury (Bergsneider et al, 2000; Ruff et al., 1994). PET
is commonly used by forensic medicine practitioners to
demonstrate diffuse axonal injury, which is characteristic of
mild traumatic brain injury (Mehr & Gerdes, 2001; Rao,
Turski, Polcyn, Nickels, & Flynn, 1984).
Clinical SPECT of the brain
The most common clinical use of brain SPECT is to analyze
regional brain-blood perfusion, Blood flow is relevant to the
brain as it delivers the elements essential to brain function,
such as oxygen and glucose, to the brain regions associated
with specific cognitive and behavioral processess. SPECT
compounds are typically low-molecular weight and
lipophilic, allowing them to easily cross the blood-brain
barrier (Westera, 2003). The blood flow (perfusion) tracers
are distributed in the brain in accordance with regional
blood flow over a known period of time, usually measured
in minutes, providing an average image of brain perfusion
over a fixed time period of a few minutes. The gamma rayemitting isotope most commonly used in brain SPECT
radioligands is technetium-99m (99mTc) (Castronovo,
1975). The most common clinical uses of brain SPECT is to
characterize neurodegenerative disorders such as dementia,
as well as perfusion abnormalities associated with stroke,
seizures, inflammation and trauma (Dougall, Bruggink, &
Ebmeier, 2004).
PET and SPECT basics
Both PET and SPECT utilize the energy of photons emitted
during nuclear decay for image formation, but differ in the
source and nature of these photons. In SPECT, a single
photon is emitted in the decay of 99mTc and detected by
two or three gamma cameras rotating around the patient
(Tukington & Gilland, 2003). With PET, the process is more
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complicated: PET isotopes undergo radioactive decay via a
process known as positron emission or positive beta decay.
During this decay a positron and a neutrino are emitted from
the radiotracer. The emitted positron travels through the
tissue, until it collides with a random electron and both are
annihilated. During annihilation, two gamma photons with
energy of 511 keV are released in opposite directions at a
1800 angle from each other and are detected by the PET
scanner cameras that are arranged in a stationary ring
around the patient.
In SPECT the gamma camera contains a collimator, a crystal,
and an array of photomultiplier tubes. The collimator design
ensures that the camera records only the photons that come
directly from the patient. The crystal is a material that emits
flashes of visible light known as scintillations when highenergy X-ray or y-ray photons strike it. The light emitted by
the scintillator hits the surface of the nearest photomultiplier
tube. The photomultiplier tube converts a flash of light into
an electrical signal that allows measurement of the energy
of the incoming y photon. A series of images are produced
as the cameras move around the patient and record data
from multiple angles. The more angles obtained by the
camera, the better the resolution of the image. The total scan
time is typically around 20 minutes. Patient motion and the
amount and specific activity of the radiopharmaceutical
affect image quality (Zaidi & Hasegawa, 2006).
In PET, timing rather than a collimator is used to record
only the photons that come directly from the patient. A PET
scanner contains an extremely precise clock allowing a
determination of whether two rays hit detectors at the same
time, a process known as coincidence detection. Only
photons that arrive within a few nanoseconds of one another
are recorded as coincidental hits. Once a coincidental hit is
registered, a computer calculates the straight line between
the two rays, called a line of response; the positron that
generated the coincidence rays originated somewhere along
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the line of response. By counting millions of these
coincidental hits around a large number of cross-bearings,
the size and position of the structure that has taken up the
radioligand is determined. By combining the lines of
response from many different angles, the data can be
reconstructed into cross-sectional images, and form the
basis of creation of the 3-D image (Shepp & Logan, 1974).
Detecting brain abnormalities using
nuclear medicine imaging
There are two main approaches to diagnosing a brain
abnormality using nuclear scans. First, an evaluee's nuclear
medicine study can be compared to a previously obtained
study Of the same individual. Second, the study can be
compared to a preexisting normative study or a group average
(Provenzano, Jordan, Tikofsky, Saxena, Van Heertum, &
Ichise, 2010; Zhang, Mitsis, Chu, Newmark, Hazlett, &
Buchsbaum, 2010). In order to validly diagnose metabolic
or blood flow abnormalities, there must be a clearly defined
normal population. Each facility should have an accessible
database of normal controls to which nuclear medicine
studies are compared (Mehr & Gerdes, 2001). Such
databases are commercially available or can be generated at
each individual site. Typically at least 10 subjects are
needed to generate a database, though more subjects will
improve the ability of the database to differentiate normal
intersubject variability from disease (Chen et al., 2008; Iseki
et al, 2010). When quantitative comparisons are made to
normal databases, the patient's image data must first be
coregistered to the normal database. Because the brains of
each individual subject are of different shapes and sizes,
nonlinear transformation of the image data to force all the
images into the same shape is necessary in order to perform
quantitative comparisons between any two brains or an
individual brain and a control group. Most clinical nuclear
medicine study reports are the result of a semiquantitative
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analysis in which the results are based on regional
concentrations of measured radioactivity, normalized to an
internal reference standard, such as whole brain activity,
corrected to the actual time of imaging. This is known as the
standardized uptake value (Silverman & Alavi, 2005). The
technique may involve warping the patient's anatomic
structure obtained in the MRI to PET to obtain regions of
interest on PET. The regions of interest can then be
compared to whole brain glucose metabolism, yielding the
region of interest to whole brain ratio (Resnick, Karp,
Turetsky, & Gur, 1993).
A number of factors must be considered when comparing
metabolic patterns across brains. For standardization
purposes, gender, age, handedness, environmental
conditions at time of the study, level of alertness, presence
of medications, serum glucose levels, and the amount of
tracer that passes into the brain are all important variables
that must be considered when comparing one individual's
brain scan to a group of controls.
Use of nuclear imaging in criminal trials
For the last decade there has been much debate concerning
the admissibility and the appropriateness of expert witnesses
discussing brain scans in the courtroom (Appelbaum, 2009;
Greely & Illes, 2007). Legal scholars have expressed fears
that colorful pictures will distract jurors from the true legal
issues they must decide (Gurley & Marcus, 2008). As this
debate has waged, brain imaging has become an important
tool used clinically by physicians to detect potential brainbased explanations for abnormal behavior. Not all abnormal
behavior is criminal behavior; some is, and there is potential
for criminal behavior to follow abnormal behavior. We
predict that as nuclear imaging and other modes of
functional brain imaging such as fMRI enter the realm of
standard medical practice, the rate of admission of

functional brain scans into evidence will increase
dramatically. At present, the phase of trial during which the
functional brain scan is offered as evidence is an important
variable in whether an admissibility challenge will be
raised. Prior to discussing specific examples of evidentiary
challenges, we will review basic information about criminal
law and criminal trials.
There are two elements to a crime-the physical act that the
state or governing body defines as illegal (actus reus) and
the mental state that the person had at the time he or she
committed the act (mens rea). In order to convict an
individual of a crime, the state must prove that the person in
custody (the defendant) committed the charged act and that
the person knew or should have known that the behavior
was wrong. The government can prosecute, convict, and
punish a person in the criminal justice system if the person
committed the crime, was responsible at the time of the
crime, and therefore deserves punishment. When
enumerating illegal acts, states also determine the specific
penalty or range of penalties associated with each crime.
A criminal trial is divided into two phases: the guilt phase
and the sentencing phase. In criminal trials a jury will issue
a verdict on a defendant's guilt or innocence and a judge
will then issue the corresponding sentence. In capital
murder trials, a jury will determine guilt or innocence. If a
defendant is found guilty, a jury will then take part in a
second hearing known as the penalty phase, where they will
sentence the defendant to life in prison without the
possibility of parole, or to death.
In order to escape a mandatory punishment for a given
crime, a guilty (or risk-averse, innocent) defendant may
waive his right to a trial on the issue of guilt and plead to a
lesser crime, which is associated with a lesser sentence. The
legal term for this is a "plea bargain." Most criminal cases
in the United States result in a plea bargain. In cases that do
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move forward to trial, attorneys may engage private
investigators, psychologists, psychiatrists, and other experts
to assist the court in understanding the defendant's state of
mind and reasoning at the time the crime was committed. If
a defendant was not thinking rationally due to mental illness
or extreme emotional distress, he may be less blameworthy
under the law (Morse, 2011). At present, functional brain
imaging is not a tool used clinically to determine whether
patients are in a rational state of mind or if they are
mentally ill. As functional brain imaging moves from the
research setting into standard clinical practice, these tools may
become standard in diagnosing mental illness, but at present
they are not used clinically to diagnose mental illnesses,
unless brain damage, cancer, epilepsy, stroke, or dementia is
suspected as the underlying cause for the abnormal behavior.
When functional imaging is offered for diagnoses other than
those for which there are well established patterns an
evidentiary challenge is likely to arise.
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the introduction of
evidence in civil and criminal proceedings in Federal courts.
The rules of evidence used in many states have been closely
modeled on these provisions. Rule 702 addresses Testimony
by Experts and reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case. (Fed. Rule Evid. 702)
Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to reflect case law including
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals(1995), which
held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
incorporate the Frye "general acceptance" test (Frye v.
United States, 1923) as a basis for assessing the admissibility
of scientific expert testimony. Despite this change to the

federal rules of evidence, the Frye standard is maintained in
many states including Alabama, Arizona, California,
Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Scientific procedures, principles or techniques that may be
discussed by the expert during trial must be "generally
accepted" by the relevant scientific community. A question
that may arise during trial in a Frye state could be: Would
other psychiatrists or nuclear medicine physicians also rely
on PET for diagnosing or evaluating this disorder? The
opposing side could then refute general acceptance by
calling an expert who would testify that many psychiatrists
and nuclear medicine physicians would not agree that PET
could be used to evaluate the condition in question.
The Daubert standard was initially touted as a more lenient
standard for admission of scientific evidence, but time has
proven it effective at limiting admission of scientific
evidence that falls short of its criteria. Prior to trial, the
judge will review the submitted evidence and determine
whether the scientific method or reasoning is valid and
could be properly applied to the facts at issue in the case.
The judge must consider whether the theory or technique in
question can be and has been tested; whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication; its known or
potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling its operation; and whether it has
attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community. The majority of states' evidentiary standards are
based on the Daubert standard.
When a party wants to prevent the introduction of scientific
evidence to the jury, the party will file a motion in limine
before trial begins to attempt to exclude presentation of the
evidence. Motion in limine will be discussed further in the case
examples that follow.
In the following section, we will discuss specific case
examples in which an evidentiary challenge has arisen to
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admission of functional brain imaging data. The following
case examples were obtained through a search of the
medical literature and court documents. No individual
discussed below was clinically evaluated by the authors.
Pre-trial, competence to stand trial
A defendant must possess a rational and factual
understanding of his charges and the legal process, and he
must be able to communicate with counsel to be competent
to stand trial (Dusky v. U.S., 1960). Mental illness, brain
injury, dementia, and mental retardation can significantly
affect these abilities. If a defendant is found incompetent to
stand trial, the trial is delayed until the defendant becomes
competent to respond to the charge. However, there are
some conditions that cannot be remedied and therefore
neither the passage of time nor treatment is likely to restore
competence. In these cases the prosecutor may choose not to
pursue certain charges or may commit a defendant to a
mental facility to attempt restoration of competence. The
U.S. Supreme Court established the current legal standard
for determining competency to stand trial in Dusky v. United
States (1960), and subsequently every jurisdiction has
adopted this standard into their competency statutes. The
issue of the ultimate fate of incompetent defendants was not
addressed until several years later. In Jackson v. Indiana
(1972), the Supreme Court held that a defendant committed
to a mental facility solely on the basis of incompetency
"cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future." Physicians will be asked to predict
whether a defendant's competence to stand trial can be
restored. There will be cases in which it will be clear to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that capacity cannot
be restored. In some cases functional imaging may be part
of the medical work up to determine the severity of a brainbased cause for incompetence.
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Consider the case of a person with dementia. Use of
structural MRI and PET is commonly used clinically to
confirm the presence of degenerative brain disease
(Desgranges et al., 2002; Ishii et al., 2001; Jeong et al.,
2005; Juh, Kim, Moon, Coe, & Suh, 2004; Newberg &
Alavi, 2005). Conditions such as Alzheimer's disease,
frontotemporal dementia (Pick's Disease) and Parkinson's
disease are irreversible and incurable. While medications
may slow the progression of these diseases, patients are not
expected to improve from cognitive deficits caused by these
illnesses. In cases where cognitive decline is present and a
person is unable to work with their defense attorney, a
finding of incompetence to stand trial is possible.
Depending on the severity of the crime the prosecuting
attorney may require more evidence to support the alleged
irreversible diagnosis.
Vincent Gigante, an alleged mafia boss, was found guilty of
a number of federal criminal charges including conspiracy
and racketeering. Mr. Gigante was examined by several
psychiatrists who found that he suffered from dementia on
clinical examination. A PET study was submitted in support
of this finding. Mr. Gigante claimed that he was
incompetent to be sentenced due to his dementia. The court
admitted the PET evidence but declined to rely upon it. The
court noted that the scan was of "excellent technical quality
but [offered] a number of difficulties in interpretation."
Specifically the court was concerned that the controls in the
study were not treated with the same psychotropic drugs
that Mr. Gigante was prescribed, including chlorpromazine,
nortryptiline, diazepam, temazepam, and flurazepam.
The court noted that if Mr. Gigante were taking these
medications, they would have a profound effect on the PET
metabolic images; however, it was impossible to say what
the combined effect would be. Ultimately, Mr. Gigante was
found competent for sentencing and was sentenced to 12
years in federal prison in 1997.
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In 2011, California capital murder defendant Miguel
Carrizalez offered a PET study to support his claim that he
was incompetent to stand trial. A Kelley-Frye hearing was
held and the study was admitted into evidence. The judge
stated that PET studies are "generally accepted in the
scientific community and ... are certainly accepted as tools
used in clinical settings. And in forensic settings it seems ...
there could be testimony as to the areas of the brain that are
relevant to the issue of [trial competency]" (California v.
Carrizalez, 2010).
Plea bargaining
Likewise, in some cases evidence of a medical illness or
explanation for criminal behavior can lead prosecutors to
offer a plea bargain when they may not have done so
without this evidence. Consider the case of Herbert
Weinstein, a 65-year-old man who strangled his wife to
death in their Manhattan apartment and then threw her body
out of their 12th story apartment window. Weinstein was
promptly arrested and charged with 2nd degree murder,
which carries a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. PET
was performed and showed a large arachnoid cyst pressing
on the brain and immensely altering the expected glucose
uptake. The prosecution tried to prevent evidence of the
arachnoid cyst from being admitted at the 1992 trial, as the
technology was new and not widely accepted (People v.
Weinstein, 1992). The judge ruled that the defense could
show the brain scans with the cyst but would not allow the
defense witnesses to tell jurors that arachnoid cysts were
associated with violence (Rosen, 2007). Shortly after the
ruling on the admissibility hearing, the prosecution offered
Weinstein a plea bargain in which he pled guilty to
manslaughter, which carried a sentence of 7 to 21 years in
prison.
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Guilt phase
When nuclear images are admitted into evidence to prove a
prima facie element of the crime, namely mens rea,
admissibility challenges are more likely to arise. Challenges
are less likely to prevail if the incomplete defense of
diminished capacity or a variant thereof is at issue. When a
defendant raises a diminished capacity defense it is to
suggest that he was deprived of a normal level of mental
wherewithal. Not every state employs this partial defense. In
states that do, it can function to reduce the charge of the
offense and could be thought of as a non-plea-bargain way
to receive a discounted sentence. For example a finding of
diminished capacity could reduce a murder charge to
manslaughter. In contrast, a finding of insanity is a complete
defense to a crime and will result in a finding of "not guilty
by reason of insanity" (NGRI). SPECT has been used to
support a claim of "diminished actuality" (similar to
diminished capacity) in a California murder trial (Sneed,
2006). Mr. Peter Chiesa was a 65-year-old man with multiple
medical problems including vascular dementia, epilepsy,
strokes, and a complicated coronary artery bypass surgery.
Chiesa called 911 informing police of his plan shortly
before he shot and killed two female neighbors in 2002. The
defense used SPECT to illustrate to the jury how Mr. Chiesa's
brain was "misshapen" and "contained holes" to argue
against a premeditated first degree murder charge. The jury
did find diminished actuality and Mr. Chiesa was convicted
of two counts of second degree murder (Lasden, 2004).
To defeat an admissibility challenge, functional brain
imaging must demonstrate information that is not otherwise
available to the clinician. In People v. Goldstein (2005), the
defendant Goldstein pushed a woman in front of an
oncoming subway train, killing her. All parties agreed that
defendant Goldstein had schizophrenia. PET was offered by
a defense expert witness to show that Goldstein's brain
imaging was consistent with schizophrenia. As PET was not
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offered to further probe into the impact of schizophrenia on
the defendant's cognition and behavior, it was excluded
from evidence (Moriarty, 2008).
An expert's attempt to introduce functional imaging for
novel purposes, or in ways that are not standard in clinical
medical practice, can be risky. In Jackson v. Calderon
(2000), the court stated that PET is not a generally accepted
tool used to diagnose chronic PCP use and excluded the
evidence. In United States v. Mezvinsky (2002), PET was
not admitted into evidence as the expert planned to use it to
show that the defendant, a former congressman charged
with 66 counts of fraud, was incapable of deception, an
element necessary to prove fraud. In these cases the court
opined that the relevance of the evidence was outweighed
by its capacity to mislead the jury.
In most death-penalty sentencing cases any evidence likely
to persuade the jury to take mercy on the defendant is
admitted and nuclear studies of the brain, such as PET or
SPECT, are almost always admitted at sentencing when
offered by the defendant. However, in the case of capital
defendant Lisa Montgomery, PET was not admitted. We
surmise that the attempt to admit PET during the guilt phase
of the trial excluded its use in sentence mitigation.
Lisa Montgomery had an online friendship with her
pregnant victim Bobbie Jo Stinnett. The two had engaged in
email exchanges about their respective "pregnancies."
Montgomery arranged to meet Stinnett and buy a puppy
from her. Montgomery strangled the expectant mother,
performed a cesarean section and kidnapped Stinnett's
premature baby. Stinnett died but her premature daughter
survived. Montgomery crossed state lines with the baby,
making her crime a federal offense. In Montgomery's
defense, expert witnesses planned to testify that
Montgomery suffered from pseudocyesis, or false
pregnancy, which could have led to a diminished capacity

finding. Pseudocyesis is a psychiatric condition listed in the
DSM IV Somatoform Disorder Not Otherwise Specified
(DSM-IV-TR 300.82) (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). While pseudocyesis has long been hypothesized to be
caused by an imbalance in pituitary-ovarian function and
dysregulation of the hypothalamus (Brown & Barglow,
1971), neuroimaging confirmation of such dysregulation is
virtually never sought in clinical practice.
Though Ms. Montgomery's PET did indeed show increased
activity in the hypothalamus, the scan was deemed
inadmissible. On appeal the court considered whether Ms.
Montgomery was harmed by the failure of PET admission
during the guilt phase of her trial. The court stated "The
PET scan was not used as a diagnostic aid for pseudocyesis,
and as conceded by [defense expert witness], the abnormalities
do not predict behavior and they did not cause Montgomery
to commit the crime. Accordingly, any error in excluding
the evidence that Montgomery's PET scan showed
abnormalities in the limbic and somatomotor regions of the
brain was harmless" (U.S. v. Montgomery, 2011).
Sentencing
In Lockett v. Ohio (1978), the Supreme Court decreed that a
defendant facing the death penalty is entitled to present any
aspect of character or record, and any circumstance of the
offense that might serve as a basis for a sentence less than
death, regardless of whether the evidence supports a
statutorily authorized mitigating factor. In Tennard v. Dretke
(2004) the Supreme Court stated that any cognitive or
neuropsychological impairment may be considered a
mitigating factor even if the impairment bears no direct link
with the homicidal behavior. Evidence of a structural or
metabolic brain abnormality could be included as evidence
of a severe mental disturbance, a prong that most states and
the federal government include as a mitigating factor in the
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death penalty statute. Further, most states allow a defendant
to present any "other factor" in the defendant's background,
record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense
that mitigate against imposition of a death sentence (18
U.S.C. § 3592 (1994)). Evidence of brain damage or brain
dysfunction can be offered under the other factor prong as
well. Functional images of the brain are commonly admitted
in death penalty litigation to demonstrate brain abnormalities
that a jury could find mitigating (Sneed, 2006).
Appeal
If an attorney fails to present mitigating evidence including
evidence of mental illness or extreme emotional distress, a
case can be remanded for ineffective assistance of counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington
(1984). A case may be remanded if a criminal defendant can
show that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that counsel's performance
gave rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had
performed adequately, the result of the trial or sentencing
would have been different.
Defendant Fernando Caro's death sentence was vacated and
remanded for retrial in California, because his attorney
failed to investigate and present evidence of the impact that
exposure to neurotoxicants and child abuse had on his brain
(Caro v. Calderon, 1999). The court stated that attorneys
must cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence at
capital sentencing hearing because "the Constitution
prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate
consideration of factors which might evoke mercy" (p. 1227).
In detailing the sort of evidence that should have been
considered, the court does not state that neuroimaging is
needed. Rather, it gives an extensive list of circumstances
that were likely to lead to brain damage, including that Caro

spent his childhood working and playing in pesticide-soaked
fields; that he bathed in and was fed food cooked in water
contaminated with pesticides. The court notes that Caro
worked as a "flagger" for a crop-dusting company and at a
company that made toxic pesticides. He was regularly
exposed to organophosphates, solvents, organochlorines,
and carbamates, and he was poisoned by a number of toxic
chemicals at the plant. In addition, Caro has suffered serious
physical abuse and head injuries. Both parents beat Caro
throughout his childhood, hitting him with closed fists,
sticks, belts, work boots, and tools. Caro also sustained
several head injuries as a child: he was born with a three
inch lump on his head due to the use of forceps during his
difficult delivery; a water cooler fell on his head at the age
of three; and he was hit by a car later that year. If brain
damage resulted from these multiple neurologic insults, the
damage could be demonstrated with PET or SPECT. In
Caro, the court suggests that it is adequate for counsel to
obtain a corroborated injury history listing factors that led to
demonstrated cognitive impairment. Caro does not penalize
council for failing to obtain or present neuroimaging;
however, other cases have (Hoskins v. State, 1997; Smith v.
Mullin, 2004).
SPECT has been used as mitigating evidence in criminal
trials for capital murder. In Smith v. Mullin (2004), the court
ordered a resentencing hearing for Mr. Smith, a man found
guilty and sentenced to death for murdering his wife and her
four children from a prior relationship. The court found that
the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to
present evidence of his cognitive abilities and brain damage.
The court noted that evidence of his brain damage was
shown in SPECT authorized by the court, but not raised by
counsel in the original trial.
In Florida, defendant Hoskins challenged the trial court's
judgment convicting him of multiple felonies, including
first-degree murder, as well as the imposition of the death
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sentence (Hoskins v. State, 1997). Mr. Hoskins had an IQ of

71 and an examining physician recommended that PET be
ordered as part of the work-up for brain damage. The trial
court refused to grant defendant's motion seeking transport
to a hospital to have a brain scan performed. This denial
limited his defense expert's ability to evaluate the degree of
his mental impairment, which is a statutory mitigating factor
under Florida law (Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (1995)). The
appellate court remanded the case, ordering that a brain scan
be obtained and consideration of a new penalty phase, in
effect overturning Hoskins' death sentence.
The decision in this case has led attorneys to seek nuclear
medicine studies for many death eligible defendants in
Florida. When an attorney requests a nuclear scan, the role
of the expert remains the same-to evaluate the defendant
for symptoms and medical history that would spark clinical
suspicion for brain damage. We discourage experts from
issuing prescriptions for nuclear medicine studies without
first evaluating the patient and from offering explanations for
an abnormal study result without obtaining clinical history.
Francis Hernandez' death sentence was vacated because his
attorney failed to consult a neurologist, neuropsychologist or
neuropsychiatrist, or to arrange for a neurological
examination of petitioner, despite the fact that he wrote notes
in his legal file suggesting that he planned to do so. On
appeal the lawyer stated that "evidence of neurological
impairment is the type of evidence I wanted because it would
have helped to explain and mitigate Francis's state of mind at
the time of the killings" (Hernandez v. Martel, 2011).
Civil liability: Torts
SPECT is commonly utilized in "toxic tort" cases, in which
a plaintiff claims brain damage due to chemical exposure, as
well as in personal injury litigation, such as in a claim of

brain damage following an automobile accident. Many
plaintiffs have been successful in introducing SPECT into
evidence even when admissibility was subject to a Daubert,
Frye, or other scientific evidentiary challenge.
In Penney v. Praxair (1997), a personal injury case, the
defense presented evidence that PET results can be affected
by a person's age, medical history, and medications. The
plaintiff Mr. Penney was a 66-year-old man with cardiac
issues. Mr. Penney's scan was compared to a control group
consisting of 31 individuals ranging from 18 to 70-yearsold. The court felt that the control groups' wide age range
was not an accurate comparison for the brain metabolism of
the 66-year-old plaintiff. Further, Mr. Penney was taking his
regular dose of heart medications at the time of the PET.
The court acknowledged that it was not clear whether the
medication impacted the results, but found that the plaintiff
had failed to carry his burden of establishing a reliable
foundation for his PET reading compared to controls, who
were not taking medications. PET was not admitted into
evidence.
SPECT has been used to support the presence of brain
injury in toxic tort cases. In determining whether or not to
admit a nuclear medicine study into evidence, the judge will
determine whether the evidence is likely to assist the jury in
determining a fact in issue during the trial. In Rhilinger v.
Jancsics et al. (1998), the issue before the court was
whether Ms. Rhilinger sustained brain injury after exposure
to fumes emanating from chemicals stored in the basement
of her apartment building. A motion in limine sought to
exclude admission of SPECT into evidence. The judge
stated that there was no dispute that SPECT can show
abnormalities in brain function. He acknowledged that there
is no dispute that SPECT cannot conclusively establish the
existence or nonexistence of toxic solvent encephalopathy
in a patient. The judge emphasized that the plaintiff's
experts did not opine that SPECT did, in fact, establish the
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diagnosis of toxic solvent encephalopathy, but that SPECT
was a tool that could be used to investigate this claim.
SPECT was admitted into evidence.
Likewise, in Fini v. General Motors Corp. et al. (2003), the
court concluded that the use of SPECT may have important
implications for classification and management of patients
with mild head trauma, such as closed head injury,
providing "clinical correlation" for the physical examination.
In Ms. Fini's case, SPECT was used to show "massive
frontal lobe brain damage" sustained in a motor vehicle
accident.
In contrast, in Summers v. Missouri Pacific RailroadSystem
(1995), the court did not admit SPECT into evidence in a
Federal Employers Liability Act case where plaintiffs were
railway workers exposed to diesel exhaust fumes. The
plaintiffs were diagnosed with "chemical sensitivity," an
injury to the central nervous and respiratory systems.
SPECT was offered to support the diagnosis. The defense
raised a Daubert objection claiming that the true diagnosis
of plaintiff's expert is "multiple chemical sensitivity," a
diagnosis which is not supported by sound scientific
reasoning or methodology, and which should be excluded
under Daubert. The defense was persuasive in its argument,
and SPECT was not admitted into evidence.
Further, an expert's testimony and nuclear medicine study
are likely to be excluded if the expert overstates the causal
links that can be inferred. In the case of Palazzolo v.
Hoffinan la Roche Inc. (2010), a products liability case, the
plaintiffs expert witness claimed that PET could provide
evidence linking a patient's depression and subsequent
suicide to a medication, Accutane, that the patient used to
treat his acne. Prior to trial, plaintiffs and defendants had
stipulated that PET was not a tool used in the diagnosis of
depression. As the expert's line of reasoning was in conflict
with the stipulation, PET was excluded from evidence.

Nuclear studies are also increasingly being admitted into
evidence in civil trials where brain injury is claimed. In fact,
there have been cases in which litigants may have been
penalized for failing to undergo nuclear studies. Harris v.
U.S. (2005) was brought by a law student, who was struck
by a U.S. Postal Service truck while driving to his law
school final exam. He filed a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act asking for damages based on his diagnosis of
mild traumatic brain injury (TBI) resulting from the
accident. The court noted that although PET or SPECT
could be used to confirm a diagnosis of mild TBI, Harris
had not offered either as evidence of his injury. In part due
to the lack of neuroimaging evidence, the court found that
the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffers from continued
cognitive impairment as a result of the accident. The case
illustrates the courts' fear that a sophisticated plaintiff could
"fake" a neurocognitive deficit on clinical interview and on
pen-and-paper-based tests. In Harris it appears that the
court assumes that it would be difficult or impossible to
manipulate brain blood flow and metabolism during a
nuclear study, therefore making malingering less of a risk if
a scan supports a clinical suspicion of brain damage.
Conclusion
Nuclear medicine studies can assist the court by allowing it
a view of the inner working of the brain of the plaintiff in
civil trials or the defendant in criminal trials. This view is
not given the same level of relevance in every court phase.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has determined that
a defendant's cognitive and neuropsychological limitations
must be considered in all death penalty cases. Failure to
present evidence of brain damage has been a factor in
overturning death sentences as evidence of brain damage
could assist a jury in understanding the defendant's
limitations and could result in a sentence other than death.
PET and SPECT can demonstrate functional abnormalities
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in brain metabolism. As such, brain imaging introduced as
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial is unlikely to face an admissibility challenge.
However, the judge may exclude functional brain imaging
during the guilt phase of the trial if he or she believes that
the expert will use the evidence to mislead the jury.
Presentation of brain imaging studies during the guilt phase
of a criminal trial is more likely to evoke an evidentiary
challenge. Nuclear studies cannot assist the trier of fact in
determining whether the defendant committed the act
in question. Similarly, brain images will be unable to assist
in detailing the mindset of the defendant at the time of the
crime with a few important exceptions. A brain study can
demonstrate structural abnormalities such as cysts, tumors,
strokes, and tissue atrophy that could lead to functional
deficits and as such reduce the defendant's capacity for selfcontrol. Diminished capacity for self-control is not a
complete defense to a crime, but will decrease criminal
culpability and the associated penalty.
Brain damage is a common claim in civil trials. PET and
SPECT are generally admissible to support claims of brain
damage. However, when claimed injuries are not injuries
which have well-accepted imaging characteristics, it will be
difficult to overcome an admissibility challenge. As discussed
earlier in the article, to withstand a Frye challenge the specific
type of a nuclear medicine evidence (i.e., 18-FDG-PET, Tc99m
ECD-SPECT, etc.) must be "generally accepted" by the
relevant medical community as a means for evaluating the
disease or disorder in question. To withstand a Daubert
challenge, in addition to widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community, the method must have a known
error rate and be scientifically tested with results reported in
peer-reviewed publications. In cases involving brain damage
secondary to trauma or toxic exposure, plaintiffs are likely to
overcome evidentiary challenge to nuclear medicine
evidence, because of the preponderance of available medical

data. When the injury claimed involves a syndrome with less
peer-reviewed data available, evidentiary challenges are
more likely to prevail until additional data become available
to support or reject the diagnostic relevance and validity of a
specific nuclear medicine study for the syndrome in
question. The legal and forensic community should strive to
increase its knowledge of and involvement with the
continued improvement of the diagnostic nuclear medicine
imaging that could serve the purposes of justice.
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